631 defensive and compelled to fight a rearguard action for maintaining
642 its existence.

Step by step, Stalin and the Russian Communist Party was changing the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics into a Russian empire with its non-Russian dependencies and, despite the Constitution of the Union and of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, it was becoming ever more and more clear that the latter was to be treated merely as a geographical colony of the new Russian-dominated union, with no attention to its wishes or its needs.[1]

This had been evident from almost the first days of the Five Year Plan. Whatever might have been the original blueprint of this, it early became evident that the Soviet Union could only carry out its work of industrialization and collectivization, if everything were forced into a single plan. In connection with this, the various republic commissariats had been reduced to All-Union commissariats and all independent power of judgment or planning had been removed from the local organs. If it were a question of developing a mine, of building a new factory, of introducing a new and more profitable crop, of constructing a new road or railroad, the authorities of the Ukrainian Soviet Republic had to refer the matter to Moscow and receive the permission to act from the central authorities of the Union. How could it be otherwise?

The central government had assumed the responsibility for the development of the country and it could not carry this on, if the local communities or republics had the power to meet any but the most primitive needs without consultation and permission. Moscow had decided how industry was to be developed, which branches were to be built in the RSFSR, which in Ukraine, which in the other republics. That plan was almost absolute and, warned by the fate of the fallen Communist leaders, the new successors were ultra-cautious in venturing to express an opinion.

● [625] The OGPU had been remodelled into the NKVD, the People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs, but this was placed under the same Yagoda who had been the head of the OGPU and he merely assumed greater powers and greater responsibilities for the safeguarding of the Soviet order.

[1] [1930's - after famine -- Analyst]

The First Occupation of Western Ukraine

The old newspapers ceased at once to appear,[1] but the new occupants started in all of the main cities new Communist newspapers as the *Free Ukraine* in Lviv and the *Soviet Ukraine* in Stanyslaviv. They allowed also a Communist Polish newspaper the *Red Flag* and a similar paper in Yiddish. 728 [204]

The old officials were at first encouraged to return to their posts, whether they were Polish or not but in a very short time they began to disappear and they were replaced by Ukrainian-speaking persons, some from the neighborhood and some from eastern Ukraine. At almost the same time, while preparations were begun for the proposed plebiscite, the authorities quietly picked up and incarcerated most of the old political leaders, especially those of the UNDO, the Ukrainian National Democratic League, the representatives of those parties that had sought a normalization of relations with the Poles. [661]

In the same slow and unobstrusive way the Polish police of the different cities were replaced by a "national militia." This was composed of armed groups of young men who more or less volunteered for the work of maintaining order. The Ukrainian and the Jewish organizations tried to bring these self-appointed groups under control but this proved a difficult task for, in many cases, the new Soviet authorities had encouraged some of the more lawless and tumultuous elements to undertake the work so as to profit themselves by the resultant chaos and to facilitate the calling in of their own people. [625]

This era of anxiety on the part of the population and of extreme moderation on the part of the occupying forces lasted for almost a month, while preparations were being made for the election of representatives of all organizations, factories, and groups to a National Assembly for the consideration of reunion with the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic. Meetings were held everywhere, at which attendance was compulsory, and everywhere there was expressed by selected speakers the gratitude of the people for their liberation from the Polish lords and the imperialistic capitalists. Khrushchov and other high functionaries arrived from Kiev to conduct these elections and to superintend the preparation of the lists of delegates. Yet it was almost at once noted that while there 728 666

[1] [1939, Russian occupation of Poland -- Analyst]

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To round out the picture, however, one must add that the methods employed by the Ukrainians to win ground back from the Poles were not limited to cultural development. In line with the policy described above, the Germans frequently appointed mayors of ethnographically mixed towns from among the Ukrainian element, thus giving the latter a decided advantage in the civil administration. The separate police system was also staffed in a manner favorable to the Ukrainians, although the Germans closely supervised this force. Nevertheless, in numerous cases their position in the police detachments enabled the Ukrainians to harass and even to attack the Poles.[20]

While the Ukrainian nationalist forces were being strengthened by the creation of a new base in the Generalgouvernement, the OUN was being gravely weakened by a fierce internal conflict. The fundamental causes of this conflict have been examined in the preceding chapters. Its catalytic element was the liberation of the most active leaders of the younger generation from the Polish prisons.

In Cracow, where most went, they came into contact with the comrades with whom they had fought and suffered before their imprisonment, and a new grouping rapidly coalesced. The nominal leader was Volodymyr Lopatyns'kyi, who was the official director of the *krai* OUN—i.e., the organization on Ukrainian ethnographical territory in Poland.[21] Along with him came other young men who had long been active in the struggle against the Polish authorities—John Gavrusevych, Iaroslav Horbovyi, Leo Rebet, and many others. For the most part these men, vigorous as they were, had been confined, by the nature of their conspiratorial work, to Poland, and consequently were not very familiar with the broader aspects of the OUN. They were a hardened group of rebels, remarkably courageous and inured to a life of insecurity, but deprived by this very training of

[20] Activity report of the chief of the Ordnungspolizei, November 11, 1940, Occ E-2 (11), in Yiddish Scientific Institute (hereafter referred to as Occ E-2 [11]). This German official reported that "lack of proper training" enabled the Ukrainian auxiliary police to take a partisan, even a vicious attitude toward the Poles, and gave as an example the necessity of arresting two Ukrainian officers who had failed to hinder attacks on Poles by armed Ukrainians.

[21] Interviews 24, 75.

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IV. THE OPENING OF THE UKRAINE

LONG BEFORE the Western world guessed his intentions Hitler had begun preparations for a campaign against the Soviet Union. As early as 1940 the Germans surreptitiously formed military training units for Ukrainians. Their enlistment was concealed by official statements that the units were for *Volksdeutsche* (ethnic Germans) only, and the purpose of the units was disguised by designating the Reichsarbeitdienst (Reich Labor Service) to be the supervising agency in the Generalgouvernement. Under this camouflage large numbers of Ukrainians were trained for police duty. More advanced training was carried out in Germany under direction of the Wehrmacht. In a number of camps instructors for future Ukrainian police units and interpreters for liaison with the German army were prepared.[1] At first, the chief Ukrainian organizer of this work was Colonel Sushko, and the training units were under the influence of the Mel'nyk group. After the split had fully developed, however, Bandera elements secured the upper hand in many of the groups, which were predominantly composed of young men fitted for active field service.[2]

Either because they were naturally interested in employing the young and physically qualified Ukrainians in the Bandera party for the forthcoming campaign, or because they were dissatisfied with the previous efforts of the OUN-M (Mel'nyk group) to pursue a somewhat independent course, the Germans turned more and more to the insurgent faction. This was especially the case when, in the early spring of 1941, the comparatively unconcealed development of Ukrainian units was begun by the Wehrmacht.

[1] Stepan (Stephen) Huliak, "Polk im. Kholodnoho Iaru v Rivnomu" (The Kholodnyi Iar Regiment in Rovno), *Visti Bratstva kol. Voiakiv l. UD UNA* (August-September, 1952), p. 7.

[2] MS D.

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tives coming from the west. Numerous local citizens, mostly young men but including also several administrative officials, joined the Nationalist organization. Support was so strong, in fact, that a new district organization (Kraieva Ekzekutyva) of the Mel'nyk party could be formed, headed by the son of the chief of the *oblast* administration and another local leader.[56] Generally speaking, OUN-M influence was predominant in the civic life of Zhitomir as the summer of 1941 drew to a close.

The first OUN-M organizers appear to have arrived with the Wehrmacht. Foremost among them was Bohdan Konyk, a Galician, who was especially concerned with police organization. At the end of July, with the help of a young Carpatho-Ukrainian journalist, George Tarkovych, whose numerous articles are a major source for this period, he went with German authorization to a nearby camp of Soviet war prisoners and selected volunteers for the police force.[57] Zakhvalins'kyi, an East Ukrainian by origin who had once been a member of the Ukrainian Republican Army but who had lived for many years as a common worker in France, was made commander. He was an adherent of Mel'nyk. As his deputy, a local nonparty man, Kalenda, was chosen, while the commander's adjutant was a Bukovinian member of the Mel'nyk party.[58]

A major task of the police force was to prepare an organization for installation in Kiev, as soon as the capital should fall into German hands. The same purpose was evident in the formation of a newspaper, *Ukraïns'ke Slovo;* this organ was destined for transfer to Kiev as soon as possible. Consequently, the chief propaganda workers of the eastern group of the OUN-M were active in its creation. Among them were John Rohach, a Carpatho-Ukrainian, Iaroslav Chemeryns'kyi, one of the leading émigré writers, and Peter Oliïnyk. Under their direction, a number of able local journalists were recruited, though not all of them were adherents of the Mel'nyk party.[59]

All of these preparations served as a backdrop for the most

[56] Interviews 12, 65; cf. V. Druzhynnyk in *Krakivs'ki Visti,* October 10, 1941, p. 2; *OUN u Viini,* p. 53.

[57] Cf. Tarkovych in *Krakivs'ki Visti,* January 21, 1942, p. 2; Interview 35.

[58] Druzhynnyk in *Krakivs'ki Visti,* October 10, 1941, p. 2; Interview 65.

[59] *Nastup,* November 8, 1941, pp. 3–5; Interviews 3, 65.

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chief of administration.[9] Having achieved this post, he repaid the organization which had assisted him by using his influence to secure the adherence to the OUN-M of the most important officials.[10]

While most of the economic and cultural divisions of the city government were left in the hands of local men, the OUN forces took care to organize the most important branches—propaganda and police—under their own followers. Zakhvalins'kyi was brought from Zhitomir to take command of the police units, but after a short period, in which his alleged incompetence and dissolute life made him objectionable to his party, he was replaced by one of the Galician leaders, Roman Bidar. Kandyba soon arrived to take charge of propaganda activity. With him came the staff of *Ukraïns'ke Slovo,* headed by John Rohach. The newspaper was to be printed in Kiev, but the destruction of the principal press by the explosions forced the editors to continue publication for some weeks in Zhitomir.[11]

Having captured Kiev, the German armies rapidly pushed on to the east, taking with them most of the interpreters and advisers who had formed an essential part of the OUN-M "conquest" of Zhitomir and Kiev. By the end of October, they had reached Kharkov, where Konyk took the lead in propaganda work. He and his assistants succeeded in recruiting a considerable number of the local intelligentsia for their organization but, as will be shown later, failed in their attempt to attain a high degree of success similar to that in Kiev.[12]

Lest repeated reference to collaboration of the Mel'nyk forces with the Wehrmacht lead to an exaggerated conception of the role of the OUN-M in the operations of the German army, it should be pointed out that the latter employed many Slavic interpreters and advisers in addition to the Mel'nyk followers. Some of these were Ukrainians, of all political persuasions, including Bandera supporters. Strong efforts were made to get rid of the latter after the decision to suppress their party, but for a

[9] Bahazii assumed the post on November 1 (*Nastup,* December 20, 1941, p. 2).
[10] Interviews 53, 65.
[11] Iurii Tarkovych in *Krakivs'ki Visti,* January 21, 1942, p. 2; *Nastup,* November 8, 1941, p. 3; Interview 65.
[12] See Chapter X.

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727 the departments of administration. In such cases the department
633 heads who were on good terms with their German superiors seem to have been able to pursue courses substantially independent of the mayor, and this was also to an extent true of the firmer or more clever of those who wished to exert their own authority even without special German support. Consequently, it sometimes happened that one or more sections of a municipal administration were strongholds of nationalist activity, while the city as a whole was administered by elements opposed to Ukrainian independence.

Under the Soviet system, the municipal administrations had included departments of finance, communal economy, internal trade, health, popular education, social security, and cadres, as well as a general department, a planning commission, and sometimes departments of local manufacturing and agriculture. In the city administrations under German occupation, there was evidently some consolidation of departments, but in general the Soviet division was little changed, except for the elimination of the planning commission. On the other hand, several new departments were added for functions which had been performed by higher Soviet administrative levels but which the Germans wished to allocate, under their own control, to the cities. One was the propaganda department, which will be discussed somewhat later. Another was the juridical department, which operated a system of lower courts.[13] It was, however, of little or no importance as a channel of nationalist activity. Much more significant in this
625 respect were the police departments. Some indications of their
727 activity in nationalist affairs have already been given. The Ger-
633 mans, of course, exerted great efforts to keep this element of authority, the only branch of the local administration which could have offered armed resistance to their rule, under firm control. Since the police power was regularly in the hands of German SP officials, who frequently maintained only a nominal subordination to the *Stadtkommissar,* the Ukrainian chief of this department was correspondingly independent of the mayor.

[13] On the legal system in the Reichskommissariat, see Nicholas Laskovs'kyi, "Practicing Law in the Occupied Ukraine," *American Slavic and East European Review,* XI (April, 1952), 124 ff.

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Moreover, since there were several German police authorities— ordinary security police, secret police, railway police—operating in the same area, unified at the top but having different Ukrainian subchiefs operating under them, the possibility of several competing or antagonistic influences existed. In spite of the special concern of the Reichskommissariat to root out all OUN members in the police, the latter were able for many months to maintain their positions in several cities. For example, while the city administrations of Vinnitsa and Dniepropetrovsk were in the hands of Russophile elements opposed to Ukrainian nationalism, the police chief in the former city[14] and the Ukrainian in charge of the secret police in the latter[15] were supporters of the OUN. Close as was the supervision of the German police authorities, it was obviously impossible for them to watch every action of their subordinates, so that possession of such support within the police force was of great value to the nationalist groups.

In the wave of repression in Kiev in December, 1941, the fact that his sympathizers controlled the police in the *raion* in which he was arrested allowed the chief of the OUN-M in the East Ukraine, Dr. Kandyba, to secure his release, thus enabling him to prolong his activities for more than two years.[16] Moreover, the presence of nationalist elements in the police force served to prevent the control of these groups by secret Communist agents, who were successful in penetrating the police in a number of places in the southern Ukraine, and for a while in Kiev itself, through the German practice of retaining the Soviet *militsiia* as a matter of convenience.[17] Whatever value the nationalist penetration of the police force may have had in this connection was largely offset by the odium which attached to the nationalist groups when it became known to the population that they were collaborating with the Germans in this fashion. Moreover, the ill repute of the police was sometimes increased by the actions of the nationalists themselves who used the police as an instrument for terrorizing non-Ukrainians.[18]

[14] Interview 1.
[15] Interviews 1, 18.
[16] L. Dniprova, article in *Ukraïns'ke Slovo* (Paris), June 18, 1950, p. 3.
[17] Interview 59.
[18] It is said that the Ukrainian police in Kiev, when ordered to secure hostages

[Ukrainian constitution as of Nov. 21, 1949]

631 Art. 68. The superior Soviets of Working People's Deputies have the right to annul decisions and orders of inferior Soviets of Working People's Deputies and of their Executive Committees.

634 Art. 69. The regional Soviets of Working People's Deputies set up the following Departments and Administrations of their Executive Committees:

a Department of Cultural and Educational Work
a Department of Art
a General Department
a Department of the Municipal Economy
a Department of Local Industry
a Department of Public Education
a Department of Public Health
a Department of Social Maintenance
a Department of Trade
a Department of Finance
a Department of Roads

and the following Administrations:

a Cinematographic Administration
a Light Industry Administration
a Local Fuel Industry Administration
an Agricultural Administration
a Food Industry Administration
a Planning Commission
a Cadres Sector

under the Chairman of the Executive Committee and, in addition, in accordance with the specific features of the economy of the Region, the regional Soviets of Working People's Deputies set up the following Departments, subject to confirmation by the Union-Republican Ministries of the Timber Industry, Meat and Dairy Industry, Building Materials Industry, Fish Industry and Textile Industry:

a Department of the Timber Industry
a Department of the Meat and Dairy Industry
a Department of the Building Materials Industry
a Department of the Fish Industry
a Department of the Textile Industry.

625 Art. 70. The Ministry of Internal Affairs, the Ministry of State Security and the Ministry of Justice of the Union set up their own administrations under the regional Soviets of Working People's Deputies, in accordance with the conditions of the region and on the basis of the laws of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic.

Art. 71. The Departments and Administrations of the regional Soviets of Working People's Deputies are subordinate in their activities both to the corresponding regional Soviets of Working People's Deputies and their Executive Committees and to the corresponding Ministries of the Ukrainian SSR.

Art. 72. The area Soviets of Working People's Deputies and their Executive Committees carry on their work on the basis of the laws voted by the Supreme Soviet of the Ukrainian SSR, decrees of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Ukrainian SSR, decisions and orders of the Council of Ministers of the Ukrainian SSR and orders of the Regional Soviet of Workers' Deputies and their Executive Committees.

632 Art. 73. The district Soviets of Working People's Deputies set up the following Departments of their Executive Committees:

[Ukrainian constitution as of Nov. 21, 1949]

632

a Department of Cultural and Educational Work
a Department of Roads
a Department of Public Health
a Department of Public Education
a General Department
a Department of Agriculture
a Department of Social Maintenance
a Department of Trade
a Department of Finance
a Planning Commission
a Cadres Sector

under the Chairman of the Executive Committees and, in addition, in accordance with the specific features of the economy of the district, the district Soviets of Working People's Deputies set up the following Departments, subject to confirmation by the respective regional Soviets of Working People's Deputies:

a Department of the Municipal Economy
a Department of Local Industry.

629 Art. 74. The Ministry of Internal Affairs and the Ministry of State Security set up their Departments under the district Soviets of Working People's Deputies in accordance with the conditions of the district, on the basis of the laws of the USSR and the Ukrainian SSR and subject to confirmation by the corresponding regional Soviet of Working People's Deputies.

Art. 75. The Departments of the district Soviets of Working People's Deputies are subordinate in their activities both to the district Soviets of Working People's Deputies and their Executive Committees and to the corresponding Departments of the regional Soviets of Working People's Deputies.

633 Art. 76. The city Soviets of Working People's Deputies set up the following Departments of their Executive Committees:

a Department of Cultural and Educational Work
a Department of Public Health
a Department of the Municipal Economy
a Department of Public Education
a General Department
a Department of Social Maintenance
a Department of Trade
a Department of Finance
a Planning Commission
a Cadres Sector

under the Chairman of the Executive Committee and, in addition, in accordance with the specific features of the city's industry and its municipal and suburban economy,

a Department of Local Industry and
a Department of Agriculture.

Art. 77. The Departments of the city Soviets of Working People's Deputies are subordinate in their activities both to the respective city Soviets of Working People's Deputies and their Executive Committees and to the corresponding Departments of the district Soviets of Working People's Deputies or directly to the corresponding Departments of the regional Soviets of Working People's Deputies.

Art. 78. The Departments of city Soviets of Working People's Deputies of Kiev are subordinate in their activities both to the Kiev Soviet of Working People's Deputies and its Executive Committee as well as to the corresponding Ministry of the Ukrainian SSR directly.